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What Exactly Are the Intra-Trinitarian Relations? 
 
I. WHAT IS A TRINITARIAN MODEL? 
In his Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology, Thomas McCall claims that analytic 
theology should be a “retrieval theology” – that it should examine and critically engage various 
theological proposals from Christian tradition. McCall insists that such a retrieval is especially 
wanted in the contemporary analytic discussions of the doctrine of the Trinity, which have been 
“fairly loose” in their use of the tradition1. It is true that the majority of analytic debates over 
social vs. Latin models of the Trinity are quite independent from theological heritage of the 
Early and Medieval Church. Very few contemporary philosophers have used arguments from the 
tradition in their own reasoning about the Trinity. Even those who have incorporated some of the 
historical material into their theories usually treat the tradition uncritically, either as a convenient 
example of a kindred spirit in the past, or as an authoritative point of reference. McCall’s ideal of 
the retrieval theology requires critical examination of the traditional Trinitarian models. Such a 
retrieval of the historical models is a promising area of research in itself, and it would be of great 
value for the contemporary analytic debates about models of the Trinity. 
If we are to embark on a quest to retrieve the traditional Trinitarian models, what exactly 
should we be looking for? What is a Trinitarian model? I take it that the minimal requirements 
for a conception to qualify as a Trinitarian model consist of addressing the following questions: 
1. What are “the three” in the Trinity, and what is “one” about them? The very idea of the 
“Tri-nity” implies that there are things to count, things of the same ilk; so the question is, what 
are those entities that we count ending up with the number 3? And what is this entity that we 
count as one in connection with those three? 
2. How is there unity in plurality, and plurality in unity? In other words, what is 
responsible, or what accounts for the three being one, and what accounts for the one being three? 
To my knowledge, this is the question which contemporary analytic Trinitarian theology finds to 
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be most appealing, since the majority of the debates are about some proper mixture of unity and 
plurality. 
3. How each of the three is distinguished from the others? Answering this question is 
necessary for a Trinitarian model to be exhaustive. Unfortunately, most of the contemporary 
analytic models of the Trinity do not even attempt addressing it. As I see it, this is a major 
deficiency of the contemporary models, and this is where the retrieval of the traditional models 
could be of great value. 
I guess, I should have added yet another question: Why is the number 3 not accidental to 
the Trinity? But that would be unfair. There are so few models that address this question, not 
only in our time but also in the tradition, that adding this requirement would be too much of a 
burden. 
So, if we want to retrieve different Trinitarian models from the tradition, we should look 
there for answers to those three questions. What are those traditional answers? 
1. As for the first question, there is only one orthodox answer. Initially, there was a variety 
of opinions, but the synod of Alexandria in 362 A.D. validated only one conventional formula: 
that which is one in the Godhead is essence, and those which are three are hypostases, or 
persons. 
2. There is also a remarkable unanimity among the Church fathers in their answers to the 
second question: the foundation of unity is the divine essence, and the foundation of plurality are 
the intra-Trinitarian relations. Why relations? In the early 3
rd
 century Christian theologians came 
up with the idea that the names “Father” and “Son” indicate relations, and relations indicate 
plurality
2
. But the real breakthrough occurred somewhere in the middle of the 4
th
 century. In the 
thick of the debates with the followers of Arius, some pro-Nicene theologians happily stumbled 
upon a convenient philosophical idea: the Aristotelian category of relation is the only category 
that is not predicated to the essence. This maneuver was immediately taken up and transformed 
into an argument against the Arians. While the Arians argued that any plurality endangers the 
unity of the divine essence, the pro-Nicene theologians answered that since relation says nothing 
about the essence, then the relative distinctions in the Godhead do not violate the unity of the 
divine essence; therefore the distinctions in the Trinity must be according to the category of 
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relation. From then onward it became the standard way of treating plurality in the Godhead in 
Catholic theology
3
. 
3. At this point, however, the patristic consensus has reached its end. There was no 
unanimity about a proper way of distinguishing the divine persons. While the Church fathers 
agreed that we should somehow apply relations to the distinctions in the Trinity, they did not 
have the same understanding of what the intra-Trinitarian relations really are. Unlike the 
widespread Aristotelian and Stoic lists of categories, which involved a category of relation, there 
was no conventional metaphysical theory of relations at the time. Different theologians came up 
with different ideas about the nature of relations, and that resulted in different ways of 
distinguishing one divine person from another. The only patristic consensus here was about the 
general rule that the distinction between the persons must be described according to their 
relations, but how one should interpret that rule was a matter of individual metaphysical 
preferences. 
 
II. HOW TO RETRIEVE A TRINITARIAN MODEL? 
Since the answers to the first two questions from our list are standard and well-known, our 
quest for patristic Trinitarian models should be focused only on the third one. We should also 
keep in mind that the only distinction between the persons that was approved by the Church 
Fathers is the difference in their mutual relations. Therefore, we have to narrow down our 
question for the patristic writers. Formulated in a more technical way, our main question 
(henceforth: “our main question”) should look like this: “What is the relational internal structure 
of the Godhead, and how does it allow identifying the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit?”4. 
Looking for answers to our main question in the patristic writings would be more efficient 
if we could equip ourselves with up-to-date tools of analytic metaphysics. Unfortunately, as in 
the patristic era, the contemporary metaphysics of relations is “still in its infancy”5. Nevertheless, 
in spite of its infancy, it is already capable of providing some apparatus for the analysis of the 
patristic relational models. I suggest using the taxonomy of relations that is widely applied in 
mathematics and analytic philosophy. We will need such categories as the degree of relations, 
the symmetry, and the externality. 
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The degree of relation (also known as adicity or arity) is the number of things that are 
involved in the relation. Thus, a “two-place” relation (a.k.a. dyadic or binary) has the degree of 
2, a “three-place” relation (triadic or ternary) has the degree of 3, and so on. If the relation has a 
definite degree (for example, it is always binary, or always ternary), then it is a unigrade 
relation. If it does not have a definite degree, i.e. it can be either binary, or ternary, or something 
else, it is called a multigrade relation. 
We will also use a distinction between symmetric and asymmetric relations. By definition, 
if x has a symmetric relation to y, then y has the same relation to x. And, by definition, if x has an 
asymmetric relation to y, then y does not have that same relation to x. 
Finally, we will need the distinction between external and internal relations. This 
distinction is not entirely clear and there are ongoing debates about its proper criteria
6
. 
Nevertheless, the basic idea is that a relation is internal if it is necessitated by the intrinsic 
properties of the related objects, otherwise it is external. 
Having equipped ourselves with this taxonomy of relations, we are ready to proceed with 
our quest for retrieval of traditional Trinitarian models. Due to the limits of this paper I will 
mention only a few models – those of Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and Boethius. In addition I will 
examine a medieval attempt to combine the patristic ideas – the Trinitarian model of Aquinas. 
 
III. PATRISTIC TRINITARIAN MODELS 
1. Pre-Cappadocian Trinitarian relations 
The earliest complete answers to our main question in the history of Christian theology are 
given by the Great Cappadocians, namely, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory 
of Nyssa. But before we proceed to their relational Trinitarian models, we should take a quick 
look at the earlier tradition. From the time of Tertullian and Origen
7
, there was a persistent 
theological line of reasoning that the name “Father” indicates that there is an eternal relation of 
fatherhood in God, and that, in turn, implies that there must be an eternal relation of sonship in 
God, which does not belong to the Father. This was not, however, a complete Trinitarian model, 
because the pre-Cappadocian theology did not address relations with the Holy Spirit. Since it 
fails to identify the third person of the Trinity, it does not provide a satisfactory answer to our 
main question. The incomplete model includes only two relations – fatherhood and sonship, 
which are binary, asymmetric, and internal (Figure 1). 
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Persons: F = Father, S = Son, HS = Holy Spirit. 
Relations: R1 = “fatherhood”, R2 = “sonship”. 
Figure 1. Pre-Cappadocian relational model 
Why bring it up if this was not yet an exhaustive model? There are two reasons for that. 
First, it was a meaningful step towards later fully developed relational models, and it would be 
worthwhile to compare this early idea with its future developments. The second reason has to do 
with the fact that the later Church fathers considered this reasoning to be a part of their 
authoritative tradition. They would often reproduce this discourse even if their own treatment of 
Trinitarian relations was quite different. In other words, not every statement which comes from 
the mouth of a Church father is an integral part of his own characteristic doctrine. And we have 
to be aware of those extraneous elements while retrieving original Trinitarian models. 
 
2. Basil of Caesarea 
The first complete Trinitarian model comes from Basil of Caesarea. His writings on the 
Trinity are not entirely consistent, and his ideas are vulnerable to many criticisms; nevertheless, 
Basil provides the necessary elements of an exhaustive Trinitarian model. Before introducing his 
own ideas, Basil repeats the traditional discourse about the names “Father” and “Son” that 
indicate mutual relations
8
. Afterwards, he claims that divine persons can be distinguished by 
their peculiar properties (ἰδιώματα) – “fatherhood”, “sonship”, and “sanctifying power”9. Since 
those properties are distinctive for the persons, they must be relations (Figure 2). 
 
Relations: R1 = “fatherhood”, R2 = “sonship”, 
R3 = “sanctifying power”. 
Figure 2. Trinitarian model of Basil of Caesarea 
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Basil’s Trinitarian relations differ from the traditional ones. While his predecessors taught that 
“fatherhood” is that which distinguishes the Father from the Son, Basil’s idea implies that 
“fatherhood” is not a mutual relation, but it is simply a property which defines the Father. In 
other words, for the predecessors, “fatherhood” was a binary relation, but in Basil’s model it 
becomes unary. Thus, Basil’s model can be described as containing three different unary 
relations, and each of the three relations pertains to only one of the divine persons. As for their 
symmetry and externality, unary relations are, obviously, internal, and symmetry does not apply 
to them. 
 
3. Gregory Nazianzen 
The next model we will address belongs to Basil’s younger friend, Gregory Nazianzen. It 
would be misleading to assume that the Cappadocians must have a common Trinitarian 
theology
10
. Gregory’s model and his relational terminology are unique11. It is not easy, however, 
to extract his original model from his writings. While talking about the Father and the Son, he 
does not hesitate to repeat and even build upon the traditional binary fatherhood/sonship 
approach. Moreover, he also pays his respects to his senior friend’s idea of personal distinctive 
properties, simply changing Basil’s terminology of unary “fatherhood, sonship, sanctifying 
power” into “ungenerated, generated, proceeding”. It is only when he addresses our main 
question, i.e. attempts to identify each of the three persons (especially the Holy Spirit), we can 
see his own original ideas. Gregory introduces two Trinitarian relations – “generation” for the 
Father and the Son, and “procession” for the Father and the Spirit (Figure 3). 
 
Relations: R1 = “generation”, R2 = “procession”.  
Figure 3. Trinitarian model of Gregory Nazianzen 
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For his predecessors, a relation pertains to only one of the persons; but for Gregory, relations 
pertain to pairs of persons
12
. Thus, the Spirit is identified as the one who does not participate in 
“generation”, and the Son is the one who is not in “procession”. This relational model is 
complete and fully functional, and it successfully answers our main question. It consists of two 
different binary relations, which are symmetric and external. 
 
4. Boethius 
Our next model is of the Western origin. It has its roots in Augustine
13
, and it was brought 
to completion by Boethius. Boethius claims that there is only one relation that obtains in the 
simple divine essence, and that is the relation of identity or sameness. But, strangely enough, this 
relation of identity is not symmetric – it is directed from the Father to the Son, and from both of 
them to the Holy Spirit (see Figure 4)
14
.  
 
Relation R = “identity” (or “procession”). 
Figure 4. Trinitarian model of Boethius 
Boethius allows likening this relation of identity to the creedal term “procession”. The Son 
proceeds from the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son
15
. This elegant 
solution allows answering our main question: he, who the relation is from, is the Father; he, who 
the relation is to and from, is the Son; he, who the relation is to, is the Holy Spirit. Thus, 
Boethius manages to produce an exhaustive Trinitarian model by utilizing only one relation, 
which is multigrade, asymmetric, and internal. 
Let us stop here for a moment and compare the three Trinitarian models (Figure 5). It is 
obvious that they are completely different and incompatible. Each one of them has its own set of 
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relations, uses different types of relations, and identifies the divine persons in its own unique 
way. Each one of them, however, is an exhaustive and viable model, and each one conforms to 
the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity.  
Author Number of relations Degree of relations Symmetry Externality 
Basil of Caesarea 3 1 n/a internal 
Gregory Nazianzen 2 2 symmetric external 
Boethius 1 multigrade asymmetric internal 
Figure 5. Patristic Trinitarian relations 
Will it be worthwhile to bring them all together, as if they were just fragments of a greater 
picture? Should we consolidate them into one extensive Trinitarian model? I am certain that we 
ought not to do that. Each of them already is a complete picture and does not require any 
enhancement. There was, however, a theologian who attempted to produce an all-embracing 
Trinitarian model – St. Thomas Aquinas. 
 
5. Thomas Aquinas 
The model of Aquinas is a complex arrangement of several types of Trinitarian relations 
(see Figure 6).  
 
Subsistent relations: 
R1 = “fatherhood”, R2 = “sonship”, R3 = “procession”.  
Relations of origin:  
opposite: R4 = “fatherhood”, R5 = “sonship”;  
non-opposite: R6 = “spiration”, R7 = “procession”. 
Figure 6. Trinitarian model of Thomas Aquinas 
The first type is the subsistent relations
16
: fatherhood, sonship, and procession
17
. The three 
subsistent relations are the personal properties, which constitute the divine persons. These three 
relations are unary, and they function in the same way as Basil’s relations: each divine person is 
identified with a certain relation. In addition to the subsistent relations, Aquinas introduces 
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another type – relations of origin18. There are four of them: fatherhood, sonship, spiration, and 
procession. Moreover, there is a further subdivision: two of the four relations of origin – 
fatherhood and sonship – are opposite relations, and two – spiration and procession – are not, 
because spiration belongs not to one, but to two persons – the Father and the Son19. Fatherhood 
and sonship are similar to the pre-Cappadocian relations, spiration resembles the procession of 
the Spirit in the model of Boethius, and the division of the relations of origin into two types – 
towards the Son, and towards the Spirit – follows the idea of Gregory. Aquinas claims that the 
persons can be distinguished only through opposite relations of origin
20
. Thus, the Father and the 
Son are distinguished through the opposite relations of fatherhood and sonship. It is not entirely 
clear, however, how Aquinas’s model identifies the person of the Holy Spirit, since there is no 
opposite relation of origin for the Spirit’s procession. All of the relations of origin are 
asymmetric and internal, while the opposite ones are binary, and the non-opposite are ternary. 
Type of relations Number of relations Degree of relations Symmetry Externality 
Subsistent 
relations 
3 1 n/a internal 
Opposite 
relations of origin 
2 2 asymmetric internal 
Non-opposite 
relations of origin 
2 3 asymmetric internal 
Figure 7. Trinitarian relations in the model of Aquinas 
The combined model of Aquinas was hardly a success. Apparently, it has no advantage 
over the models of his predecessors and does not allow achieving more than they already did. It 
is cumbersome, excessively complex, and it still fails to properly distinguish the person of the 
Holy Spirit. It utilizes seven different relations of three different types (see Figure 7), which does 
not sit well with Aquinas’s ideal of divine simplicity. I do not imply that one could do a better 
job of combining the traditional models – I believe that they are mutually exclusive, and the very 
project of their unification is doomed to failure. 
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IV. A BONUS: THE FILIOQUE 
Instead of trying to mix the incompatible ingredients together, I suggest dealing with the 
traditional models as they are. We should remember, however, that those models are not the 
sacred doctrine. Albeit being authoritative, they are, nevertheless, negotiable metaphysical 
theories. If we want to retrieve those traditional models for our contemporary needs, we ought to 
examine and critically evaluate them, preferably by using the tools provided by analytic 
philosophy
21
.  
I hope that this approach has the potential for going beyond the confines of armchair 
philosophy into the area of systematic theology. For example, it can offer a new solution to the 
embarrassing problem of the filioque
22
. A closer look at the relational language of the Eastern 
and Western Trinitarian theologies shows that the fight over the filioque, at its core, is an 
opposition between metaphysical models.  
The Western church generally follows the model of Boethius. In that model there is only 
one relation in the Trinity – the relation of procession, which is from the Father to the Son, and 
from both of them to the Holy Spirit. In order for the Western Trinitarian model to be functional, 
there has to be the relation of the Son to the Spirit, otherwise the two persons would be 
indistinguishable (see Figure 8). Thus, within the framework of the Boethius’s model, the Spirit 
must proceed from the Father and the Son.  
 
Figure 8. The filioque in the Western model 
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The Eastern theology operates within the framework of Gregory Nazianzen’s model23. This 
model has two different Trinitarian relations – “generation”, which is between the Father and the 
Son, and “procession”, which is between the Father and the Holy Spirit. If one would add an 
additional “procession” between the Son and the Spirit, then the model would fail to distinguish 
between the Father and the Son (see Figure 9). Therefore, within the Nazianzen’s relational 
model, the Spirit must proceed only from the Father. 
 
Figure 9. The filioque in the Eastern model 
The relation of procession of the Spirit from the Son – the filioque – neither should be 
forced into the Eastern model, nor should be taken away from the Western model. The Western 
“procession” is nothing like the Eastern “procession”. For the West, “procession” is the name of 
the only relation in the Trinity, which is multigrade, asymmetric, and internal. For the East, 
“procession” designates one of the two Trinitarian relations; it is binary, symmetric, and 
external. Arguing about the filioque without acknowledging the difference in the meaning of 
“procession” is simply talking past each other. Instead, analytic theologians of the East and the 
West ought to address the source of the disagreement – their metaphysical models, with 
unwavering open-mindedness and humility. 
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